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2411 Sutters Mill Ln.
Knoxville, Tn 37909
May 11, 1994
Dr. Bruce Wheeler
University Honors Department
The University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37916
Dear Dr. Wheeler:
As you requested, here is the report on prosecutorial vindictiveness.
This report provides important information about the role of
prosecutors in our criminal justice system and amount of discretion
which they are afforded. However, its primary focus is on the
interesting, and somewhat confusing problem of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. The legal world is still searching for a definitive
I feel
answer on just what exactly constitutes vindictive behavior.
like this should be a help in clearing up that issue.
This report contains an opening section defining and describing
a prosecutor and his role. It pays special attention to pressures that
are unique to a prosecutor's job, and exhibits the need for the speedy
and inexpensive disposition of a large number of cases. It then
explains the basic premise of prosecutorial vindictiveness, an abuse
of the prosecutor's discretionary power. What follows is a case
history of the development of the prosecutorial vindictiveness
doctrine, and finally an analysis of what comprises vindictive
behavior by a prosecutor today.
The references are done according
to the Uniform System of Citation, volume 15. At the end I added an
extra references consulted page, even though my reference system
doesn't require this, because I also gained understanding of my topic
through sources I did not cite.
The information found in this report should
anyone who wants to be well informed about the
and the limits of his power. Thank you for your
If you have any question regarding this
project.
me at 584-3217.

be useful to
role of a prosecutor
help in planning this
report, please call

I;Z/~
John P. Krimmel

INFORMATIVE

ABSTRACT

Prosecutors are granted a large amount of discretionary power in the

performance of their duties.

Because of this large amount of

discretion, and because of the many pressures inherent in the job

of a prosecutor, this discretionary power is sometimes abused.

One

such abuse is prosecutorial vindictiveness, "the forbidden practice of

penalizing a defendant's exercise of a right."

The Supreme Court uses

two standards in adjudicating claims of vindictiveness:

standard and the appearance .standard.

the in-fact

The Court determines which

standard to apply in each case depending upon whether or not the

prosecution has a motive to be vindictive.

In addition, the Court has

ruled that there is no such thing as vindictive behavior during plea

bargaining.
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Introduction
Lately there has been disagreement among federal circuit
courts about what kind of behavior comprises prosecutorial
vindictiveness.

This confusion has led to lengthy debate about how

these claims should be adjudicated, but little has been accomplished
to clarify the issue.

It seems as if many prosecutors and even some

judges lack an understanding of what comprises legitimate and
effective use of a prosecutor's power and what comprises vindictive
behavior, which is banned by our system of law.

There have been

several landmark decisions in this area, and their confusing and
seemingly contradictory nature has only added to the confusion
about the issue.

However, a close look at the case law of

prosecutorial vindictiveness will reveal that this problem can be
understood

and

therefore

avoided.

This report will provide all of the information you will need to
know in order to become informed about the problem of
prosecutorial vindictiveness.

After defining the role a prosecutor

plays in our criminal justice system, with special reference to the
many pressures that might lead a prosecutor to abuse his
discretionary power, the report will focus on prosecutorial
vindictiveness itself.

This focus will be accomplished by explaining

the evolution of the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine through an
extensive case study, which will be followed by an analysis of the
doctrine as it stands today.

Finally, I will propose an interpretation

that should help clarify how to adjudicate new claims of
prosecutorial vindictiveness as they surface.
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By the time this report

is finished, you will have a better understanding of our criminal
justice system in general, and a crystal-clear view of the limits of a
prosecutor's

discretionary

power.
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Definition

of

a

Prosecutor

The prosecuting attorney is one of the most valuable and
powerful public officials in today's society.

He is the person who is

responsible for making sure that justice is achieved swiftly and
accurately, and is granted a large amount of discretion in order to
balance the many demands of his job.

But since a prosecutor is

granted so much discretion over the discharge of his power, it is
important to take a look at just what a prosecutor is and what he
does.

A prosecutor, as defined in The New World Dictionary of the

American

Language, is a public official who is an attorney and who

conducts criminal prosecutions on behalf of the State or the people.
However, this definition, while it is accurate, does not give us a real
sense of who an attorney is or what he does.

It gives us no sense of

the extensive education it takes to become an attorney, the duties of
a prosecutor, the conditions a prosecutor works under, or the
pressures that come with being a prosecutor.

Because it is important

that we understand all of these things before we can grasp special
problems that plague the legal system, such as prosecutorial
vindictiveness (which will be studied in depth later in this report),
this definition is not adequate.

However, it does provide a good base

to build on in order to come up with a definition that is adequate.
The first term that we must explore in the New
definition is the phrase, "who is an attorney."

World

An obvious question

that comes to mind is, "How does one become an attorney?"

To

become an attorney today, a person must be both trained in legal
matters and licensed by the State.
3

The first step towards practicing law in most states is receiving
a law degree from a law school.

In order to be accepted into law

school, an applicant must go through a lengthy and highly
competitive process.

He must obtain a four year undergraduate

degree from a college or university, and score well on a standardized
test called the Law School Admissions Test.

Upon fulfilling these

requirements, and submitting various other things such as
recommendations of his academic ability and character to the school
of his choice, he may be considered for enrollment into an A.B.A.
(American Bar Association) accredited law school.

Upon acceptance

into such a school, a student will begin extensive study of the law.
Most law school programs take three years of study to complete.
Courses are taken in all major branches of both public and private
law.

Special emphasis is given to such subjects as torts, contracts,

taxes, and the constitution.

These and other subjects are taught

according to the case method, which was developed at Harvard Law
School.

This method trains students in legal methods through the

reading, analysis, and discussion of actual court cases.

In addition to

regular coursework, a law student participates in several other
activities.

These activities may include clerkships, writing for a

student publication called a Law Review, or

conducting mock trials

in a competition called a moot court (see figure 1).

Upon completion

of three years of law school, a student receives a J.D. (Doctor of
Jurisprudence)

degree.

Upon receiving a J.D. degree, a lawyer seeks to earn his license
to practice law.

This license is granted by the bar, the body of

lawyers who already have a license to practice in the state.

4

Figure 1

Students at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago
participate in a moot court competition.

SOURCE:

World Book Encyclopedia, Vol L, p. 138, 1993.

Normally, this license is received after successful completion of the
state bar examination.

However, a few states automatically license

graduates of approved law schools in the state without an
examination.
Upon receiving a law degree and a license to practice, a
prosecutor will take a position as a public prosecutor, usually in a
district attorney's office.

His job will then be to act on behalf of the

government to prosecute a party (usually an individual) for the
alleged commission of a crime.

At this point his duties will include

any or all of the following: gathering evidence, filing petitions,
advising others in legal matters, negotiating with the other attorney,
selecting juries, applying law to specific cases, and filing briefs.

5

Once

a case goes to trial, he prepares opening and closing arguments,
introduces evidences, interrogates witnesses, and argues questions of
law and fact.
However, most cases never go to trial.

This is because there is

a large backlog of cases in criminal courts at all times, and the courts
simply do not have the resources to fully prosecute alleged criminals
in every case.

Therefore, there is tremendous pressure on

prosecutors to negotiate with the criminals.

In this negotiation,

called plea bargaining, the prosecutor offers a defendant a lesser
sentence in return for a guilty plea.

In this way, the prosecutor can

dismiss a large number of cases relatively quickly without having to
go to all of the trouble of taking a case to court.

A prosecutor may be

tempted to enter into plea bargaining if the evidence against the
defendant is not overly compelling, if the defendant has retained a
highly skilled and successful defense attorney, if the prosecutor does
not have the resources (money, witnesses) to prosecute successfully,
or simply if there is a large backlog of cases that must be disposed of.
It is estimated that between 80 and 95 percent of all cases are plea

bargained.!
For prosecutors, another advantage to plea bargaining is that it
often leads to an impressive conviction rate for the prosecutor.

This

is important, because a high conviction rate is essential if the
prosecutor would like to be promoted or take a job in the more
lucrative private sector.

Unfortunately, this incentive to win

provides a strong temptation for prosecutors to forego justice and
convict even innocent defendants.
1 See J.

This does not happen often, but

Scheh & O. Stephens, American Constitutional Law at 836 (1993).
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abuses of the system do exist.

In the famous case Adams vs.

Texas,

defendant Randall Adams was convicted of a murder and sentenced
to death for a crime he did not commit (See figure 2).

Afterward,

Dallas County District Attorney Henry Wade allegedly bragged, "Any
prosecutor can convict a guilty man.
good to convict an innocent one. "2

But it takes someone really
Fortunately, Adams' conviction

was overturned after the actual murderer admitted that he had
committed the crime.

Even though such practices are extremely rare,

it is scary to think that the competitiveness of a court room is

sufficient enough to drive some prosecutors to sentence an innocent
man to death.
A prosecutor is a special kind of person.

He must be smart

enough and motivated enough to make it through law school and
become licensed to practice law.

He must be able to perform duties

in almost every aspect of the law, and dispose of a monumental
number of cases.

He must also be able to resist the temptations of

the spoils that accompany high conviction rates, and remember that
justice is utmost in all circumstances.

Perhaps most incredibly, he

must be willing to do all of this for the pay of a public official.

2See R. Adams, Adams v.

Texas at 301.
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Figure 2

Because Dallas County, Texas, District Attorney Henry Wade
became overly concerned with his 100% conviction
rate, innocent Randall Adams faced the electric chair.

SOURCE: American

Constitutional

p.843.
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Law. Stephens and Scheb,

Abuse

of

Prosecutorial

Discretion

As we have already found, a prosecutor in the United States
enjoys a degree of discretion that is unparalleled in the legal systems
of the Western World. 3

And, as James Madison told us, "a

governmental body wielding unbridled discretionary power is
certain to abuse that power. "4

Just as a governmental body can take

advantage of its discretionary power, so may a prosecutor.

We like

to think that abuses of this power are rare; still we know that they
do occur at least occasionally.

As we have seen, there are many

reasons why a prosecutor would like to enter into plea negotiations
and avoid a full-blown trial:

if the evidence obtained against the

defendant of is not overly compelling, if the defendant has retained a
highly skilled and successful defense attorney, if the prosecutor does
not have the resources (money, witness) to prosecute successfully, or
simply if there is a large backlog of cases that must be disposed of.
If a defendant refuses to submit a plea of gUilty (or if he does any
other thing which might complicate a case for a prosecutor) under
these circumstances, the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in
denying a defendant the exercise of his constitutional or statutory
rights to a trial, which may delay the outcome of the case and
require the prosecutor to use valuable time and money.

Therefore, it

is not beyond the realm of possibility that a prosecutor, facing these
dilemmas, might threaten and punish a defendant choosing to

3 See M. Garnick, Two

Models of Prosecutorial
Law Review at 467 (Winter '83).
4Id. at 474.
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Vindictiveness, in The Georgia

exercise his rights by forcing him to risk suffering a greater penalty.
"This type of retaliation clearly constitutes a more serious abuse of
discretionary authority, for it punishes a person under color of law
for doing what the law plainly allows. "5

The Supreme Court has

ruled that vindictiveness of this sort is "a due process violation of the
most basic sort" and a "flagrant violation of the fourteenth
amendment"

due process clause. 6

Even though the Supreme Court

has clearly ruled that prosecutorial vindictiveness is an abuse of the
prosecutor's power, there has been much debate about what kind of
behavior actually is considered vindictive by a prosecutor.

In order

to understand the present law regarding prosecutorial
vindictiveness, we must have an understanding of how the present
doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness came about.

What follows

then, is a case study of the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

5 [d.

at 475.

6 See R. Castro, Prosecutorial

Vindictiveness in the
Thurgood Marshall Law Review at 179 (Fall '85).
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Fifth

Circuit, in The

The

A.

Judicial

Doctrine of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness

Vindictiveness

1. North

is

Defined

Carolina

v.

and

Outlawed

Pearce

The first decision in the area of vindictiveness addressed the
issue of judicial vindictiveness.

This question came to the courts In

the form of North Carolina v. Pearce.

In this case, the defendant had

originally been convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and
had been given a sentence of 12-15 years.

Some years later the

conviction was set aside due to a successful appeal that the
defendant's confession had been obtained unconstitutionally.

At this

time, Pearce was retried, reconvicted, and resentenced before the
same judge that had done so in his initial trial.

This time, however,

the judge gave him a sentence that was three years longer than his
first sentence.

Because of the increased sentence, Pearce once again

appealed, claiming that he had been a victim of double jeopardy and
had been denied his rights to equal protection and due process.
The Supreme Court first dispelled the notion that Pearce had
been the victim of double jeopardy or had been denied his rights to
equal protection.

The Court went on to say that if the longer

sentence was handed down "for the explicit purpose of punishing the
defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction
set aside [it would constitute] a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth
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Amendment. "7

In an important addition to this ruling, the Court

declared that "since the fear of such vindictiveness may
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal
his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be
freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motive on the part of the
sentencing

judge. tt8

judge hands down

Also, the Court required that in cases in which a

a stricter sentence upon retrial the reasons for

doing so must ttaffirmatively appear," and those reasons must be
made a part of the record.

As a result of this decision, judicial

vindictiveness was effectively outlawed.

"In essence, the Pearce

decision established that judicial vindictiveness must play no role In
resentencing a defendant upon retrial after successful appeal of his
original conviction. tt9

This decision declared that vindictiveness was

outlawed not only in fact, but also in appearance, since the
appearance of vindictiveness might cause enough apprehension in
defendants to suppress them from exercising their constitutional
rights to due process through appeals of convictions, and to provide
extra assurance to defendants that a heavier sentence upon
reconviction was not an inherent risk of appeals.

The reasoning of

this decision set up two distinguishing models of thought about
One such model of thought, often called the in-fact

vindictiveness.

model, states that the primary purpose of the rule against
prosecutorial vindictiveness is to prevent prosecutors from acting
vindictively.

The second model, often called the apprehension or

appearance model, states that the primary purpose of the rule is to
7395 U.s. 723.
8Id.
9 See supra note 6.
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protect defendants from being deterred from exercising their
constitutional

rights.
2.

Colten

v.

Kentucky

There was little controversy surrounding the first part of the
Court's decision in Pearce.

However, many were surprised that the

Court outlawed tougher sentences in those cases almost completely,
including cases were there was no evidence of actual vindictive
behavior, since it allowed for the appearance of vindictiveness.

In

Colten v. Kentucky the defendant had been convicted of a

misdemeanor in a lower court and had exercised his right to a trial
de novo in a higher court.

He was then tried under the same facts

for a felony, and was convicted and sentenced more harshly.

Upon

appeal the Court made an exception to the appearance part of the
Pearce decision, and instead applied only the in-fact standard of

vindictiveness for this case (and subsequently others) because the
defendant was retried and resentenced before a different judge.

In

stating that when a defendant exercised a right to a trial de novo he
was risking an increased punishment if convicted, the Court asserted
that the trial was a "fresh determination of guilt or innocence. "1 0
This reasoning was supported in that the first record was not a part
of the second trial and that the judge was probably unaware of the
original sentence and therefore could not deliberately increase the
severity of the sentence.
3.

Chaffin

v.

Stynchcombe

In this case, the Court extended the reasoning that excluded the
apprehension model from cases in which a different judge presided
1 0407 U.S. 117 (1972).
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to cases in which a different jury presided.

The Court found that

there was no danger of vindictiveness upon resentencing by a new
jury for two reasons.

First, the new jury would obviously be made

up of different members.

Second, the new jury should be unaware

not only of the result but also the existence of the first trial.
Therefore, it was unreasonable to apply the appearance standard of
vindictiveness in this situation, and the defendant would have to
prove not only that there was an opportunity for vindictiveness to
occur, but that vindictiveness actually did occur.
In both Colten and Chaffin the Supreme Court focused more on
whether or not actual vindictiveness was a possibility (the in-fact
standard) and less on whether these decisions would cause
apprehension among defendants and deter them
their rights.

from exercising

The Court found that in Colten and Chaffin there was no

real possibility of vindictiveness and applied the in-fact standard to
These cases differed from Pearce

deciding claims of vindictiveness.

(which applied the appearance standard) because "vindictiveness is
only a predictable threat in situations where the second sentencing
party has a stake in the prior conviction and, thus, has a motive to be
vindictive. "1

B.

The

1

Idea

of

Vindictiveness

1.

is

Blackledge

Extended

Y.

to

Prosecutors

Perry

In 1974 the Supreme Court extended the standard of
vindictiveness for judges to prosecutors in Blackledge v.
1 1412 U.S. 18. (1972).
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Perry.

In

Blackledge the defendant, who was already serving a prison term,
exercised his right to a trial de novo.

Before the trial convened, the

prosecutor returned to the grand jury and obtained an indictment
which increased the charge against Perry from a misdemeanor to a
felony.

Upon pleading guilty, Perry was sentenced to a term that

was seventeen months longer than his initial sentence for the same
offense.

Perry then petitioned the Supreme Court on the grounds

that he had been a victim of double jeopardy and had been denied
his rights to due process.

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court declared

that the prosecutor's power to seek a greater sentence was
comparable to a judge's power to give a greater sentence.1 2

They

further noted that, like a judge, a prosecutor has comparable or even
greater reasons to be vindictive:

"appeal of the case increases the

demand on scarce prosecutorial resources, a successful appeal
increases the chances that a previously convicted defendant will be
set free, and a high conviction rate has potential political
importance. "13

Thus, the Court emphasized in Blackledge that the

opportunity for vindictiveness was present, even though there was
no evidence that the prosecutor had indeed acted vindictively.

Since

the prosecutor had a stake in the prior conviction, or at least a stake
in preventing the use of resources in order to reconvict, this case was
able to be determined according to the appearance standard.

The

Court found that the opportunity for vindictiveness was present,
even though there was no actual evidence, and declared the stricter

12See N. Whitehead, Evaluating Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Claims in Non
plea-bargained Cases, in The Southern California Law Review at 1138-39 (May
'82).
13417 U.S. 27.
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sentence unconstitutional.

In so doing the Court relied on the

purpose of preventing the defendant's apprehension that he will be
subject to an increased sentence as punishment for pursuing his
rights.

2.

Bordenkircher

v.

Hayes

Shortly after the Court reached its decision in Blackledge
another question of prosecutorial vindictiveness arose in the form of

Bordenkircher v.

Hayes.

In this case Hayes, the defendant, had been

arrested and charged with the felony of forging a check in the
amount of $88.30.
years.

This was punishable by a term of two to ten

Although Hayes technically qualified as a habitual offender

under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, the prosecutor charged
him based solely on his third arrest.

During plea bargaining, the

prosecutor offered to recommend a sentence of five years for Hayes
in return for a guilty plea.

At this time, Hayes was also informed

that if he did not accept this agreement and plead guilty, the
prosecutor would return to the grand jury and seek an indictment as
an habitual offender.

Hayes was informed that if he was convicted

under the Habitual Criminal Act he would be subject to a mandatory
life sentence because of his two prior felony convictions.

In the

subsequent trial proceedings the prosecutor described his plea offer
in the following way:

"Isn't it a fact that I told you at that time if

you did not intend to plead guilty to five years for this charge and . .
. save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial and taking
up this time that I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them
to indict you based upon these prior felony convictions?"14
1 4434

u.s.

357.
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However,

even after receiving this threat, Hayes chose not to plead guilty and
insisted upon receiving his right to a trial.

A jury then found Hayes

guilty of the charge and of being convicted twice before of felonies,
and subsequently handed down the mandatory life sentence.

Hayes

then filed an appeal based on the questionable constitutionality of
the

enhanced

sentence.

The Supreme Court upheld Hayes' conviction with the increased
sentence as constitutional.

As Supreme Court Justice Stewart noticed

in his majority opinion, nIt is not disputed that the recidivist charge
was fully justified by the evidence, that the prosecutor was in
possession of this evidence at the time of the original indictment, and
that Hayes' refusal to plead guilty to the original charge was what led
to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute. "1

5

However,

the opinion went on to note that all of this was immaterial "since the
prosecutor's conduct did no more than openly present the defendant
with the alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he
was plainly subject to prosecution. "1 6

Since the Court had decided

that the "value of open plea bargaining outweighs the need to protect
defendants from the possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness, "1 7
the effect of the decision in Bordenkircher was that it exempted
prosecutorial behavior from the limitations imposed on it by
prosecutorial vindictiveness

during

plea bargaining.

Unfortunately, however, the effects of Bordenkircher did not
stop with plea bargaining.

If it had, the issue of prosecutorial

vindictiveness would be much simpler.
1 51 d at 362.
1 61 d at 365.
171d.
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However, in its majority

opinion the Court seemingly contradicted the stance it took in North
Carolina v. Pearce and Blackledge v. Perry when it said, ttthe due
process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay not in the
possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a
legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be
retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his
conviction. "1

In other words, the Court was not only making an

8

exception for plea bargaining, but was discarding the appearance
standard for judging vindictiveness and applying the in-fact model.
This portion of the Court's stance caused considerable confusion
about the purpose of the ban against prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Lower courts were left to wonder the whether the purpose is to
protect defendants from being deterred from exercising their rights,
as had been assumed by the Pearce and Per ry precedents, or if it is
to prevent prosecutors from acting vindictively, as the majority
opinion of Bordenkircher had claimed.
3.

United

States

v.

Goodwin

Only a few years after the Bordenkircher decision, the Court
once again had to answer a claim about prosecutorial vindictiveness.
In United States v. Goodwin, a defendant was charged with a variety
of misdemeanors.

After a plea bargaining session in which the

defendant declined to plead guilty and exercised his right to request
that the trial be held before a jury instead of a judge, the prosecutor
obtained a felony indictment based on the same facts as the original
misdemeanors.

The main difference in this case from Bordenkircher

was that the prosecutor did not mention during the plea bargaining
1 8434 u.S. at 363.
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agreement the possibility that he would seek to Increase the charges
if the defendant insisted upon his right to a jury trial.

In addition,

the prosecutor in this case produced an affidavit, to be included In
the record, that listed the reasons for his increasing the charges and
denied that the defendant's request for a Jury trial or refusal to
plead guilty was one of those reasons.

Upon Goodwin's appeal that

he had been a victim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a panel of
Fourth Circuit judges reversed the conviction and, citing Pearce and
Blackledge, affirmed that the defendant should be free to exercise his

right to a jury trial without "the apprehension of retaliation. "1 9 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit somewhat surprisingly cited
Bordenkircher, because it had condemned situations which led to the

"unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen
to exercise a legal right. "2 0
Upon the Fourth Circuit's overturning of this case, the United
States filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

In an interesting

majority opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court upheld the original
conviction, and remanded it to the lower court for sentencing.

First

the Court admitted that punishment "is the very purpose" of a
criminal proceeding, and that "motives are complex and difficult to
prove, "2

1

and that "this reality had compelled the Court to establish a

doctrine that requires the government to show that certain of its
actions are not retaliatory. "22

However, the opinion went on to

describe that this presumption of vindictiveness may only arise
1 9Goodwin, 637 F. 2d at 253.
2 Old.

2 1457 U.S. at 372-73.
22ld at 373.
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when there is a "reasonable likelihood that vindictiveness exists. "2 3
Furthermore, the opinion asserted that Goodwin's conviction could
only be reversed if a presumption of vindictiveness was
warran ted. "2 4

Therefore, in order for the claim of prosecutorial

vindictiveness to be decided by the appearance standard, the Court
would have to determine through judging the situation that a
"reasonable likelihood" of vindictiveness did indeed exist.

Next, the

opinion distinguished between pre-trial and trial or post-trial
evaluations of

vindictiveness.

It stated that pre-trial claims of

prosecutorial vindictiveness must adhere to a more difficult test,
because there were several reasons why prosecutorial behavior that
might be questionable during or after the trial would be more likely
to be legitimate in a pre-trial setting.

These reasons include the

possibility of the discovery of additional evidence and the realization
of the full significance of the evidence the prosecutor had already
accumulated.

The line of thought that produced this statement

concluded by saying that evidence during the trial or after the trial
was "more likely to have been discovered and assessed," and
therefore changes in the charging decisions at that point were "more
likely to be improperly motivated. "25

In addition, the opinion stated

that defendants were "expected to raise procedural challenges before
trial. "26

Finally, the opinion talked about the very nature of the

right, insistence upon trial by jury instead of judge, that was being
asserted.

The Court concluded that this right, although it did require

2 3]d.

24]d at 381.
25] d.
26]d.
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somewhat more work by the prosecutor than trial by a judge, was
not enough of a trouble either to the prosecutor or his resources to
elicit a vindictive response.

The majority opinion read, "the burdens

of a jury trial are less significant than those imposed either by a
general refusal to plead guilty, as in Bordenkircher, or a trial of any
sort, as in Blackledge.

Unlike the judge in Pearce or the prosecutor in

Perry, a prosecutor has no stake in conducting a bench trial as
opposed to a jury trial and is not being asked to do again that which
he thought he had done correctly. "2 7
According to all of this analysis (that the change in charging
took place pre-trial, that the defense did not challenge the change at
that point, and the fact that the defendant's insistence upon a Jury
trial did not cause the prosecutor a great deal of trouble), the opinion
stated that it was not probable that the change was due to
vindictiveness.

Therefore, the Court discarded the appearance

standard of vindictiveness and required that the case be judged by
the in-fact standard.

It is important to note however, that the Court

did recognize the need and usefulness of the appearance standard for
judging certain claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

Instead of

trying to ignore or change the earlier opinions of Pearce and
Blackledge, as the Bordenkircher decision did, it openly asserted
those decisions as both wise and valid, but logically outlined the
situations which made the appearance standard inappropriate for
this case.

In Goodwin, the Court not only preserved but reiterated

the appearance standard, although in so doing the Court limited its
scope of application.
27Id at 383.
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c.

The

Present

Doctrine

of

Prosecutorial

Vindictiveness

The cases that have been outlined above are what make up the
doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness today.

From this synopsis

the case law seems fairly complicated, but reasonable and even quite
predictable.

What it amounts to is this:

there are two standards by

which claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness may be tried (see figure
3).

One is the in-fact standard.

This standard has the sole purpose of

preventing prosecutors from acting vindictively.

This standard

places the burden of proof upon the defendant to prove that the
prosecutor acted vindictively towards him.

It is used in situations

upon which the prosecutor would have little or no motive for acting
vindictively.

Those situations would be ones in which the prosecutor

had no stake in the previous conviction, would not be asked to "do
again that which he thought he had done correctly," or would not be
put to a measurable inconvenience or suffer a measurable loss of
prosecutorial resources by allowing the defendant to exercise his full
rights.
The other standard is the appearance standard.
has two primary purposes.

This standard

One is to protect defendants from being

deterred from exercising their rights by freeing them of the
apprehension that a more severe sentence is an inherent risk of
appeal or refusal to plead guilty.
from acting vindictively.

The other is to prevent prosecutors

Sometimes the in-fact standard is

inadequate to achieve this purpose because oftentimes "motives are
complex and difficult to prove."

The appearance standard places the

burden of proof upon the prosecutor to prove that his behavior was
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Figure

3

Two Standards for Evaluating
Claims of Vindictiveness
CLAIMS ADJUDICATED BY
THE APPEARANCE STANDARD

CLAIMS ADJUDICATED BY
THE IN-FACT STANDARD

All of those cases in which the state
has a motive to be vindictive, such
as:

All of those cases in which the state
does not have a motive to be vin
dictive, such as:

North Carolina v. Pearce

CoIten v. Kentucky

case retried before same
judge as in first trial.

Case retried before a new
judge.

Chaffin v.

Blackledge v. Perry
case in which same prose

Stynchecombe

Case retried before a new
jury.

cutor enhances charges
after a successful appeal

United States v. Goodwin
case in which defendant
insisted upon a trial by
jury.
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not vindictive.

This standard is applied when the prosecutor has a

moti ve to be vindictive.

Situations that would provide this motive

include those in which a prosecutor has had a stake in the previous
trial, those in which a prosecutor is asked to "do again that which he
thought he had done correctly," and those in which the right being
exercised by the defendant would cost the prosecutor a measurable
amount of his scarce resources.
Additionally, we should remember that there can be no claims
of prosecutorial vindictiveness stemming from a prosecutor's
behavior during plea bargaining.

Bordenkircher v.

Hayes served to

carve out this important exception to the doctrine of vindictiveness
in order to protect a prosecutorts power during plea bargaining.

The

Court eliminated all claims of vindictiveness within the plea
bargaining context by observing that vindictiveness is "very
different from the give and take negotiation common in plea
bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably
possess relatively equal bargaining power, "28 and "the importance of
open plea bargaining outweighs the need to protect defendants from
the possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness. "29
Still, many lower courts appear to be confused and unsure
about how to judge cases of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

Most of

this confusion comes from a lack of knowing which standard should
be used to determine prosecutorial vindictiveness in individual cases.
For instance, the Sixth Circuit favors the in-fact standard (ltthe mere
appearance of vindictiveness is not enough to trigger the Pearce

28434
29S ee

u.s.

at 361.
supra note 17.
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Blackledge sanctions. "3 0) while the Ninth Circuit more closely applies
the appearance standard.

The biggest reason for this confusion is

that these courts focus too much on the precedential effect of single
cases rather than analyzing the line of reasoning displayed
throughout the entire case law.

The other reason for this confusion

can be found buried in the portion of the Bordenki rcher decision not
dealing with plea bargaining that distorted the reasoning of the
Pearce and Blackledge decisions.

To alleviate this problem, lower

courts should simply ignore that part of the decision and restrict
Bordenkircher to its plea bargaining context.

This is because the

attempt it made to contradict the reasoning of earlier cases, in their
own context, must be looked upon as being on rather shaky ground.
In addition, it is important to note that Bordenkircher was an in-fact
case (one in which the presence of vindictiveness was openly present
and even admitted to) and thus should have little relevance to the
pre-existing

appearance of vindictiveness

doctrine. 3 1

Thus, while present application of prosecutorial vindictiveness
claims seem to be somewhat confused, there is no real need for them
to be.

Claims of vindictive behavior stemming from plea negotiations

are to be dismissed.

The appearance standard for determining

claims of vindictiveness is used under circumstances in which a
prosecutor has a motive to be vindictive.

In circumstances where

there is no motive for vindictive behavior, courts should apply the
in-fact

standard.

3 %33 F .2d at 455.
3 lSee supra note 19 at 253.
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Conclusion
The prosecuting attorney is one of the most valuable and
powerful public officials in today's society.

He is the person who is

charged with achieving justice swiftly and accurately, while
burdened with only a scarcity of resources.

In order to achieve this

nearly impossible task the prosecutor is granted a large degree of
discretion over the use of his power.

In order to ensure that the

prosecutor is qualified to handle all of the many tasks his job
requires, he must go through a lengthy and difficult educational
process.
However, upon receiving a position as a public prosecutor, the
prosecutor will find that he not only needs a complete understanding
of the law, but also needs to deal with the many pressures that are
an inherent part of his job.

,

A plethora of duties, a large backlog of

cases, a scarcity of resources, and the spoils of an impressive
conviction rate all entice the prosecutor to take any shortcuts he can
in order to successfully dispense with as many cases as possible.
These pressures are what often lead the prosecutor to abuse his
discretionary

power.

One such abuse of a prosecutor's discretionary power is
prosecutorial vindictiveness.

This is defined by the courts as "the

forbidden practice of penalizing a defendant's exercise of a right, "3 2
hence it applies to any retaliatory conduct of a prosecutor's charging
power.

3 2See

This retaliatory conduct usually occurs after a defendant

supra note 6.
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rejects a plea negotiation offered by a prosecutor or after a
successful appeal of a conviction by a defendant.
The Supreme Court has set forth two standards for judging
claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness:
appearance standard.

the in-fact standard and the

The in-fact standard has the purpose of

preventing the prosecutor from engaging in vindictive behavior and
leaves the burden of proof upon the defendant to show that the
prosecutor's actions were, in fact, vindictive.

This standard is used to

decide claims in which the prosecutor has no motive for engaging in
vindictive behavior.

The appearance standard has the purpose of

protecting defendants from being deterred from exercising their
constitutional rights by freeing them from the apprehension that a
more severe sentence is an inherent risk of appeal or refusal to plead
This standard places the burden of proof upon the prosecutor

gUilty.

to show that his actions were not, in fact, vindictive.

This standard is

used in deciding claims in which the prosecutor has a motive to act
vindictively.

Because motives are nearly impossible to prove, the

determination of which standard is to be used almost always
determines the outcome of the claim.
One important exception to this rule arose in Bordenkircher
Hayes.

v.

The decision in this case effectively disallowed claims of

prosecutorial vindictiveness in plea bargaining contexts.

This was a

result of the Supreme Court's decision that "the value of open plea
bargaining outweighs the need to protect defendants from
prosecutorial

vindictiveness. "

The lower courts still seem to be confused about how to judge
claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
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This seems to be a result of

traditional legal thinking, which stresses the importance of individual
precedents.

Unfortunately, these precedents have often been

extended beyond their original scope of meaning.

Courts need to

understand that when a new situation in this issue arises, the
outcome of the case based on that situation applies only to that
situation.

They should not attempt to extend the new precedent to

cover situations which have already been provided for.

By analyzing

the logic displayed throughout the entirety of cases that make up the
case law, instead of dwelling solely on particular decisions, these
courts would find that the present doctrine of prosecutorial
vindictiveness is fairly easy to understand and can even be quite
predictable.
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Selected
ADJUDICATE:
CASE LAW:

Glossary

To hear and decide a case of law.
Law based on previous judicial decisions, or precedents;
distinguished from statute law.

PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS:

TRIAL DE NOVO:

The forbidden practice of
penalizing a defendanes
exercise of a right.

A completely new retrial; no records of the past
trial are allowed, no testimony of the past trial is
allowed, and the outcome of the past trial has no
bearing upon the new retrial.
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